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If there is a litmus test to distinguish between so-called liberals and
so-called conservatives in the United States, it is the exclusionary
rule. More than one's views on abortion, more than one's views on
law and economics, more than one's views on Bush v. Gore,l one's
position on the exclusionary rule is viewed as a reliable indicator of
the side on which one is situated.
2
To liberals, it is a pillar of privacy;
it is essential to protect individuals from predations on the part of the
police.
3
To conservatives, it is an absurd rule through which
manifestly dangerous criminals are let out because the courts prefer
technicalities to truth.
4
Of course, I am not talking about evidence whose veracity is made
doubtful as a result of the means by which it was obtained, such as
confessions extracted through physical or psychological torture.
Rather, I am talking about evidence whose validity or "truthfulness"
is unaffected or actually increased as a result of how it was gathered,
yet where the method of obtaining the evidence ostensibly violates
constitutional or other legal commands. Consider, for example, illegal
wiretapping, warrantless searches, and stops that do not meet even the
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requirements of Terry v. Ohio.
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The interesting paradox is this: liberals ought to hate the
exclusionary rule because the exclusionary rule, in my experience, is
most responsible for the deep decline in privacy rights in the United
States. Indeed, the existence of the exclusionary rule has been the
reason for more diminutions in privacy protection than anything else
going on today. Why is this? Well, the dynamics of this process are
very easy to understand.
What, for instance, qualifies as a reasonable search (the
Constitution's reference point) is frequently a close question. On the
one hand, the police must protect society by catching criminals and by
using a variety of means to gather evidence. On the other hand,
individual privacy interests may be infringed upon by those means.
The judge who seeks to balance these conflicting values in
determining whether a search is reasonable, however, finds that there
is frequently an enormous thumb on the scale. If the judge holds the
search to be unreasonable and therefore excludes the evidence,
someone who is manifestly guilty of a very serious crime will be
released.
Judges-politicians' claims to the contrary notwithstanding-are
not in the business of letting people out on technicalities. If anything,
judges are in the business of keeping people who are guilty in on
technicalities. Regardless of who appointed her, the judge facing a
clearly guilty murderer or rapist who makes a Fourth Amendment or
other constitutional claim will do her best to protect the fundamental
right and still keep the defendant in jail. It is perfectly obvious: the
judge will do so simply because she does not like the idea of
dangerous criminals being released into society.
This means that in any close case, a judge will decide that the
search, the seizure, or the invasion of privacy was reasonable. That
case then becomes the precedent for the next case. The next close case
comes up and the precedent is applied: same thing, same thumb on
the scale, same decision. The hydraulic effect, as Chief Judge John M.
Walker, Jr. has sometimes called it,6 or the slippery slope, means that
courts keep expanding what is deemed a reasonable search or seizure.
You can look around and see how often this has happened. Exigent
5. 392 U.S. 1,20-21 (\968).
6. Conversation between Chief Judge John M. Walker, Jr. and Judge Guido Calabresi,
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
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circumstances, which used to be relatively uncommon, are now
everywhere. What was enough to permit a Terry stop used to be quite
limited.? Today, however, almost anything a policeman says to justify
a search is acceptable-and for good reason-because, case-by-case,
the precedents have broadened the reasonable search doctrine.
On a side note, it is also my sense that this situation has led police
to lie in order to prevent certain evidence from being excluded.
Indeed, Chief Judge Walker has taught me that such perjury is not
infrequent in this kind of case.
8
One may ask, "Why can't the courts
stop this?" But again, the question of fact as to whether the police are
lying, or whether the evidence was properly obtained, is often close.
If it is a close question and a judge finds that the police did not tell the
truth, then-given the exclusionary rule-a murderer or rapist will be
released. As a result, when in doubt a judge will say, "Maybe they are
telling the truth." The hydraulic effect is at work here as well.
Of course, the standard liberal response to this argument is to
question how the police can be controlled in the absence of a robust
exclusionary rule. "Without the rule," they say, "how can there be
anything to stop the police from invading privacy?" These scholars
often point to history in arguing that the lack of an exclusionary rule
would res~lt in little or no protection for privacy rights.
9
They
contend that though perhaps the rule does not work very well, it is
better than anything else. 10 And, of course, there is a lot to be said for
this position because-aside from the exclusionary rule-most, if not
all, of the suggestions for controlling the police in this area simply do
7. See, e.g., Gregory Howard Williams, The Supreme Court And Broken Promises: The
Gradual But Continual Erosion of Terry v. Ohio, 34 How. L.J. 567, 575-83 (1991)
(discussing cases that have eroded the careful balance set out in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968), by recognizing as legitimate stops those made based on factors such as time of
night and level of crime in the area, and by allowing the use of profiles to trigger stops).
8. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The "Blue Wall ofSilence" as Evidence
of Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITI. L. REV. 233,
234-37 (1998); Donald A. Dripps, Police, Plus Perjury, Equals Polygraphy, 86 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 693, 698 (1996); Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and
What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1040-41 (1996).
9. See, e.g., Timothy Lynch, In Defense of the Exclusionary Rule, 23 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'y 711, 744 (2000) ("[H]istory shows that where courts do not employ the
exclusionary rule, the problem of police lawlessness only gets worse."). See generally
Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and
Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1365,
1380-89 (1983) (explaining the development of the exclusionary rule and arguing that it is
necessary, and thus constitutionally required, to remedy Fourth Amendment violations).
10. See Stewart, supra note 9, at 1386-89 (comparing the exclusionary rule to
alternative remedies); cf Kamisar, supra note 3, at 29-30 (suggesting that proposed
modifications to the exclusionary rule would greatly limit its effectiveness).
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not work.
Ironically, one of the favorite counter-arguments of conservatives
is that the police should be taught; that is, they should be told to
behave better. I would have thought that conservatives would be more
interested in incentives as essential to any effective solution for the
exclusionary rule problem. Currently, absent the exclusionary rule,
there are almost no incentives for the police to be good actors, and in
the absence of such incentives, teaching and preaching are not going
to have much of an effect. Another standard suggestion often made by
conservatives is to punish the police officers individually. Though
such punishment, if it were imposed, might well prompt the police to
refrain from unreasonable searches, there is a fundamental incentive
problem with this solution as well. Who is going to tell us that the
police did something wrong if there is no incentive for a defendant to
report what happened? Why should a criminal accuse the police of
engaging in misconduct, and thereby incur the possible wrath of the
police, unless he has something to gain from it?
More sophisticated people such as Akhil Amar have suggested that
tort suits may resolve this problem.
l1
It is true that, nominally, the tort
regime does include the right incentives for the detained criminal to
make known police misconduct. The criminal receives the tort
verdict, and the misbehaving cop can thereafter be punished.
There are, however, two major problems with using tort law in this
manner. The bigger problem is that it does not take into account how
juries actually work in tort cases. The reason that tort suits-that great
American pastime-work the way they do in most civil cases is
because juries identify with the plaintiff. They see the plaintiff as
someone like themselves and consequently decide in favor of the
plaintiff.
Jurors are considerably more reluctant to identify with a criminal
defendant who brings a tort action against the police for violation of
his rights. In these cases, the plaintiff is a criminal and the jurors do
not see themselves in that way. Of course, the mechanism works a
little bit better when the illegal search was of innocent people. Even
there, however, the jurors tend not to identify with the people
searched. All to often, jurors think those people are the sort likely to
be criminals even if they have not committed a crime in the case at
11. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES 31-45 (1997).
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hand. Hence, they view the plaintiffs as different from themselves.
The result is that plaintiffs bringing tort actions against the police
often fail to get jury verdicts. '2
Even in the most serious cases, where people have been badly
beaten up by the police, it is, in my experience, very unlikely that a
jury will render a plaintiff's verdict. When juries do give a verdict, the
damage award is likely to be very small, for juries do not want to
reward criminals. Because damages are hard to quantify in such cases,
it is almost always necessary to guess at them. As a result, any jury
disinclination to give significant awards is extremely difficult for
courts to control.
Now, Professor Amar has come up with all sorts of complicated
multiplier approaches to counter this, and it is possible that tort suits
with multipliers may work a little bit where the search was of
innocent people. 13 But for the bulk of the people-the guilty
criminals, with regard to whom evidence has been found, albeit
illegally-tort suits just do not work.
So, in the words of that celebrated "scholar" Lenin, "What is to be
done?,,14 Well, I have my own half-baked solution to the exclusionary
rule problem. One of the things I have noticed as a judge is that even
when people have been sentenced to thirty or forty years in jail, they
fight desperately to get two points down on the sentencing guidelines.
Now at first, I wondered why the difference between a jail term of
thirty-five years and one of forty years mattered so much to
somebody. After further thought, I realized that many of the people
who are sent to jail are sexually active people in their early twenties.
The difference between getting out at my age and getting out at Judge
Walker's age may be very significant indeed. I As a result, the
possibility of moving a few points down on the sentencing guidelines
may act as a strong incentive for criminal defendants to argue that
evidence was improperly obtained.
12. See. e.g., Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse Than
the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1,61-62 (1994) (noting the failure of tort suits to prevent
Fourth Amendment violations).
13. And this is important, because the proposal that I make below would not work
directly in cases of searches of innocent people. By creating incentives against illegal
searches generally, however, it would also tend to deter illegal searches of the innocent.
Nevertheless, the existence of a sophisticated tort remedy that focuses primarily on those
cases that involve innocent victims would help to plug a possible hole in my proposal.
14. V. I. LENIN, WHAT Is TO BE DONE? BURNING QUESTIONS OF OUR MOVEMENT
(Joe Feinberg & George Hanna, trans., Int'I Publishers Co., Inc. 1969) (1902).
15. I was born in October of 1932 while Judge Walker was born in December of 1940.
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Let us consider a system where questions about the propriety of
evidence could be raised after the trial's conclusion and the
defendant's conviction. At that point, there would be no incentive for
the prosecutor to charge more ex ante. At the same time, the
convicted defendant would have a real incentive to argue that
evidence was improperly introduced. Under such a system, there
would be a hearing at which the court would determine whether the
evidence was obtained wrongfully through negligence, gross
negligence, or wanton and willful behavior. On that basis, a judge
would come down two, three, or four points on the sentencing
guidelines. (I am not interested in the calibration of the numbers
themselves at this point. That is something to be worked out later,
namely, by figuring out what "price" suffices to provide the right
incentives.)
If this system were instituted, I think defendants would readily
report any improper collection of evidence. While judges may be
tempted to place a thumb on the scale in the context of criminal
punishment, just as they are tempted to do in the context of admitting
evidence and testimony at trial, the effect is counteracted by the fact
that many judges find even the sentences at the lower end of the
existing sentencing scale to be more than adequate. Because the
sentencing guidelines are so severe, judges are not unduly worried
about whether a criminal goes to jail for thirty-five years as opposed
to forty. As a result, I do not think that the thumb on the scale would
operate anywhere near as strongly in the sentencing area as it does
when the issue is the suppression of evidence.
Similarly, when the guidelines provide for short sentences and my
approach might result in a defendant avoiding jail altogether, the
crimes at issue tend to be white-collar ones that nobody worries much
about. Indeed, the fact that the guidelines provide very low sentences
for such crimes means that the defendants are not thought of as being
all that dangerous.
Though such a system gives defendants an incentive to inform
courts about police misconduct, it still provides little deterrence for
potential bad actors in law enforcement. But this can be readily cured.
One could imagine a system that punished individual policemen when
it was discovered that the cops had acted with negligence, with gross
negligence, or willfully and wantonly. If the search or seizure was
simply negligent, the punishment might be very slight. If the police
behavior was grossly negligent, the punishment might be greater. If
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there was an intentional wrong, the penalty might be much more
severe.
Again here, I am not interested in the calibration. But I do believe
that by pairing an automatic police punishment with a sentencing
procedure that provides an incentive for criminals to disclosure police
misconduct, we would have a system that would be far more effective
in controlling the police than anything we have now, or would have
even with a mechanism based on tort suits combined with multipliers.
This is especially so because my suggested approach addresses a
major incentive problem with the use of tort damages, which, as Peter
Schuck pointed out in his book on suits against the government, are
usually paid by a totally different part of the government than that for
which the "wrongdoer" works. 16
Similarly, this approach addresses a major problem with the use of
the exclusionary rule: excluding evidence fails to affect the "cowboy"
cop very much. The cowboy has gathered the evidence, arrested the
criminals, and received all the publicity: "I've caught the perps. I did
my job, and then these crazy judges let the person out." That the
criminal was let off does not greatly deter the cowboy, who will be
affected only by a punishment that is directed specifically at him.
There are, of course, several problems with my suggestion,
including issues involving capital cases. I think there are ways of
solving these problems, but I will leave them for future discussion.
As it is, I present this half-baked idea playing the role of an
academic, rather than that of a judge. Judges cannot.afford half-baked
ideas. Only academics can engage in such flights of fancy-a great
blessing for judges and academics alike. But I do think that a potential
solution may lie in a system like the one I have described, where
privacy is protected without the absurdity of the current exclusionary
rule.
Moreover, if we had an approach like the one I have proposed, both
liberals and conservatives would be put to the test of whether they
really mean what they say. Are liberals truly interested in privacy? Or
is their defense of the exclusionary rule based on things that have very
little to do with what they say is at stake? Are conservatives in fact
interested in getting at the truth? Or are they hiding behind that
argument in order to support broad invasions of privacy that they
16. See PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL
WRONGS 106 (1983).
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think are justified? Wouldn't it be interesting if both sides focused on
what they really believe to be at play? It would certainly make the
argument a much more honest one, and it would also get rid of a
particularly irritating whipping boy-the whipping boy that judges
are just here to let criminals out on technicalities.
